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ON DELIMITING AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE  
EQUALIZATION SCHEME 
 




The discourse on the meaningfulness of Africans has taken various 
dimensions over the decades, especially as it has to do with asserting 
that Africans had her civilizations, and so were inherently dignified 
people. One of these dimensions is African Philosophy where lots of 
African scholars have invested their time and mind on examining the 
African universe and bringing forth various descriptions of the 
African life. And in line with this, some schools of thought in 
African Philosophy have developed. It seems to me that these 
schools may not be thorough and principle-based; they appear to 
have been fuelled by sentiments and ego-protection principle. How 
valid and sound are these schools of thoughts? Do these schools 
exhaust all there is to African Philosophy in the present? In this 
paper, the researcher thinks that the various schools of African 
Philosophy were not well-founded, and that there still exists another 
school of thought deducible from the various contributions of 
contemporary scholars in African thought; it also demonstrates that 
even this school of thought is an exercise in contradiction to the 




 African Philosophy as a movement in asserting and affirming the 
identity and dignity of Africans, who felt insulted, scorned, and 
crushed by occidental worldviews and ideologies. While there are all 
kinds of claims as regards its origin, some of them include; 1) the 
work of Placide Tempels, Bantu Philosophy, 2) the PhD work of 
Theophilus Okere in 1971 on “African Philosophy: A Historico-
Hermeneutical Investigation of the Conditions of its Possibility” - an 
extract was published in 1983
1
; 3) the claim of T. U. Nwala of being 
the trailblazer of the teaching of African Philosophy as a course at 
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the University of Nigeria in 1972 that is said to have triggered off 
interests for the course in other universities worldwide
2
; and 4)  the 
Great Debate that started as a result of an article in the Second Order 
in 1972. 
Defining African philosophy seems to be intricately bound up 
with an understanding the Great Debate. When the Second Order, 
An African Journal of Philosophy began in 1972 at the Obafemi 
Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, the intention of its editor, John Sodipo, 
was the examination of the structural nature of ‘traditional African 
thought’. This concern was later seen in its full manifestation, 
though, as some argue, not inevitably, as the ‘Great Debate’. The 
direction started off with a significant question by Mr. W.A. Hart:  
 
The question is whether African thought as it exists 
in Africa is the same sort of thing with thought as 
understood by the Western philosopher and we 





 The above riddle by Mr. Hart was more or less a call for 
ethnographic studies of the thought-patterns of the Africans as 
against the Europeans. This can be easily deduced from another 
statement from Hart:  
 
The development of ethnographical studies in recent 
years has aroused interest in the traditional thought 
of African peoples and has prompted the suggestion 





 Evidently, this was not a calling into question the existence of 
African philosophy. Rather, it is an invitation into determining the 
uniqueness of the African mind, which to my mind, is a veritable 
and mentally attractive target. If there was nothing unique, then one 
could have seen its equalization with European thought. The 
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reactions of the scholars became polarized between the existence and 
non-existence of African Philosophy. These opinions directly led to 
what may be described as the schools of thought in African 
philosophy. One may think that the digression by the African 
scholars towards the existence of African philosophy (apparently not 
intended by Hart) was unfounded. Nevertheless, there were many in 
the Western world, who believed that Africans have no philosophy - 
David Hume, Georg Hegel, Karl Jaspers. So, when Mr. Hart invited 
research in comparative studies, little could it not be suspected as a 
subtle expression of doubt of the capability of the African in abstract 
thought by westerners. Within this setting, we may appreciate the 
different lines of response of scholars.  
 
The Various Trends in the Definition of African Philosophy 
 In the arguments for the existence of African philosophy, its nature 
and scope, one inevitably discovers some trends of thoughts among 
the scholars. For this reason, some schools of thought have been 
discovered by C.S. Momoh, Henry Odera Oruka, T.U. Nwala.
5
 The 
various trends reveal that the ideas they defend revolve around 
certain presuppositions in regard to the definition of African 
philosophy. In other to examine these presuppositions, the writer 
would adopt a four-tier structure and query some of their ideas as it 
defines African philosophy. These structures will include
6
 




 This philosophy or mode of thought always involves the recording 
of the beliefs of the Africans. It is made up of a set of shared beliefs 
and shared worldviews. This thought-mode is the study, not of an 
individual’s vision, but a communal property. Otherwise put, it is 
bent on revealing the picture of life in operation within an ethno-
linguistic group. This ideology/ ‘reason’ - the ‘logos’ of the tribe - 
may be found as encrypted in proverbs, folklores, customs, religion, 
traditional institutions/practices, etc. Ethnophilosophy may be 
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considered as consisting of two main branches, namely: philosophic 
sagacity of the oralsophic philosophy and analytic traditionalists.  
 One major form of expression of ethnology/ethnophilosophy is 
Negritude that has Leopold Sedar Senghor and Aime Cesaire as its 
leading exponents. Negritude defines the African as 
characteristically emotion and in direct association with the skin 
colour. In approaching the reality of the world/life, the African 
followed his emotion, which makes for participation unlike logic 
(taken as defining the whites, i.e. the Europeans) that consists of 
distancing analyses. Thus, the Africans are tuned to the arts while 
the Europeans, to the sciences. Forerunners of Negritude will 




Another major expression of ethnology is Placide Tempels’ 
Bantu Philosophy. Tempels followed the Saphir-Whorf thesis that 
was popular in the first half of the last century to argue that the 
categories of the language of the Bantu people reveal the 
metaphysical categories defining their view of reality. Fr. Alexis 
Kagame of Rwanda, towing this line, argued that the culture of every 
people is arranged around a set of principles, which are embedded in 




We find other expressions of this thought-form by Marcel 
Griaule, Cheikh Anta Diop, John Mbiti, Julius Nyerere and Kwasi 
Wiredu. Evidently, ethnophilosophy has a long list of adherents with 
each implying in its position its defining feature of African 
philosophy. None of them seem to match up with each other. 
Ethnophilosophy is a chameleon with assorted colours pending 
where it manifests. So Cheikh Anta Diop rejects Senghor’s 
definition of the African as having the proclivity towards arts (not 
science and technology) while it stresses on the uniqueness of 
African culture. More than that Diop held that the African culture, as 
found in Egypt, was totally attuned to the development of science, 
mathematics, architecture and philosophy - the ground of classical 
Greek civilization. Mbiti argued for the unique structure of African 
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culture in terms of personhood, causality (supernatural) and the 
nature of time. In Marcel Griaule’s conversation with the Dogon 
priest of Ogotommeli and Odera Oruka’s interview with his father 




From the above explorations, we find the definition of African 
philosophy as centred on factors responsible for the uniqueness of 
Africans as explanatory of their contribution to world civilization. 
Diop claims that Africans are matriarchal as against the patriarchal 
structure of the Europeans - these differences should be manifest in 
the political organization of both. While there have been lots of 
criticisms directed against most of these postures, from the theorists 
themselves and from outsiders, we may note a few of them: First, 
defining African philosophy in terms of sages raises the problem that 
the difference between a non-African anthropology/ethnology and 
African philosophy lies in the nationality of the researcher (not in the 
defining elements of philosophy such as logic, epistemology and 
metaphysics). 
Two, philosophy and the history of ideas is not necessarily the 
same thing. Philosophy demands the involvement of logic, 
epistemology and metaphysics, but the history of ideas needs not 
contain these elements - the history of ideas may be only an account 
of thoughts. Thus, the beliefs of the Akan and the Yoruba may 
always remain beliefs until they are shown as having the distinctive 
features of philosophy. Calling them philosophy may mean what is 
meant when someone says that ‘my philosophy is live and let live’;
 
it 
reminisces the music of Oliver de Coque, a Nigerian Highlife 
musician titled ‘ibiri kam mbiri’ that means ‘live  and let me live’.
10
 
This aspiration of being considerate of your neighbour as one lives 
and executes his life’s projects runs deep in Africa. It is a sense of 
responsible living and cohabitation and a reminder that we need each 
other in life. 
Three, critics of ethnophilosophy would argue that focusing on 
the past as the root of authenticity detracts from a serious position 
that examines all practices in terms of their contribution to the 
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liberation of Africa. For a reason like this, Hountoundji claims that 
Tempels’ text was meant to placate Africans and assist European 
administrative targets. Though certain scholars have argued that 
philosophy is meant to reflect the particular view of a race, Appiah, 
in opposition, claims that African philosophy should not express the 
outlook of the African race. Truly speaking, ‘race’ is an illusion. As 




Fourth, in returning to excavate Africa’s ancestral pasts, there is 
a tendency to lavish praise on the bundle of our ancestral cultural life 
as if everything about it was positive and growth-yielding. There 
were many things in those traditional systems and practices that 
were very inhumane and destructive; things that humiliated men and 
women, impoverished them and permanently debarred them from 
experiencing the joy of positive exploits that come from developing 
one’s potentials and having them operational in solving societal 
problems. African Philosophy must strive to encourage positive and 
growth-driving values rather than lump these types of values 




This is a philosophical view that is rooted in the idea of logic and 
rationality. It is a school of thought that holds that Africans engage 
themselves in philosophical reflections whey they are under the 
guidance of criticality and literacy. Those who are found with this 
vision are generally regarded as the logical positivists/neo-
positivists, the analytics and the rationalists. Advocates of this 
school will include: Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountoundji, Peter 
Bodunrin and Kwame Gyekye.  
Kwasi Wiredu argues that the development of philosophy in 
Africa parallels the development of philosophy in Europe and that 
we should not assume traditional African thought for a standard of 
African philosophy in the same way that traditional European 
thought is not equal or a model for European philosophy. Paulin 
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Hountoundji is of the opinion that philosophy is critical literature 
and so African philosophy is critical literature written by Africans 
for Africans. Even at this point, the scholars are in disagreement. 
While Paulin Hountoundji and Kwasi Wiredu conceive literacy as 
necessary for the existence/practices of African philosophy, Odera 
sees active engagement in reflecting upon the assumptions of a 
cultural system as the sole prerequisite for philosophy. And this can 
occur without any invocation of literacy. Oruka puts the sages, in 
this line, on a par with Socrates. Hountoundji counters by stating the 
significance of Plato for the possibility of Socrates.
12
 
Wiredu, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Kaunda, Sekou Toure among other 
thinkers used philosophy for political reasons. But post-colonial 
philosophers are professional philosophers, who have background 
training in Western philosophy. While some condemn these 
professionals as traitors on the grounds of promoting the logic, 
epistemology and metaphysics characteristic of Western philosophy, 
Wiredu states that the job of these philosophers is to render the 
Western goods consumable by Africans. Though developed in the 
West, it could be made useful to us; this does not mean the 
concentration of energies upon foreign materials. Indigenous 
materials that are useful may be used as they can give great insight. 
Nevertheless, whether indigenous or not, the same ‘criticality’ 
should be of benefit to both indigenes and non-indigenes. 
‘Conceptual Decolonization’ is what Wiredu thinks to be the 
critical function of post-colonial African philosophy. It involves 
avoiding or reversing the unquestioned acceptance of Western ideas 
by Africans. He believes that Africans have been forced to receive 
foreign conceptual schemes and categories through religion, 
language and politics. To solve this problem, we should start 
translating the ‘conceptual projects and notions in Western terms’ 
into indigenous language. If the resultant of this translation is 
meaningful (within the native language), then we may progress with 
further considerations. If not intelligible, then we may be faced with 
a pseudo-problem brought in by linguistic domination. It is within 
language (its categories and scheme included) that we project our 
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concerns and problems. The difficulty with this solution lies in the 
multiplicity of language in Africa. In Nigeria, an example of a 
nation-state, to what extent can the linguistic uniqueness of one 
African language reflect that of the other language such as: Hausa, 
Yoruba, Ibibio, Tiv, etc.?  How does this relate to Africans in the 
diaspora, who have, say, French, English, German as their lingua 
franca? Would Wiredu’s recommendations be different from the 
ones given by ordinary language philosophy? Will it escape the 
flaws of ordinary language philosophy?
13
 
Whatever may be the outcome, it would interest us to note that 
whether it is intelligible or not, the African language into which the 
translation is aimed at already contains in itself a stream of identities 
or values that may help us develop positively or not; the onus is on 
us to purge our lingua franca of the unproductive and enfeebling 
conceptions and values they carry. I am of the opinion that it is 
inconsequential whether it is translated into our lingua franca or not 
because anyone using the foreign language must, sooner or later, 
translate the matter into his or her local dialect for effective meaning 
and use.  
The employment of rationality and logic by this group of 
scholars on African Philosophy is fatal, an exercise in nullity and a 
sheer waste of time, energy and resources. This is because the 
principles of rationality defined by logic make them inhumane, 
artificial, and totally removed from man’s experience of knowing. It 
demands, like I have argued in some of my works, for example, that 
man’s knowledge must never include emotions/passion, imagination, 
intuition, faith/belief, divine inspiration, ambiguity and irony, etc. 
Herein lies the crises of rationality in African Philosophy. I have 
argued in various places that man cannot know without the 
involvement of his emotions, faith/belief, imagination, etc.; that the 
only place you can find a knowledge that does not involve human 
emotions is artificial intelligence like computers and robots.
14
 Thus, 
any system of knowledge that must represent man’s authentic mode 
of knowing, whether under the caption of rationality and logic or 
not, has to be a restructured knowledge-system. So, for African 
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Philosophy, under universalism, to take as its starting point the 
faulty epistemic indices of Western Philosophy, it has decided to 
make a journey into irrelevance since the structure of its operation is 
not related to human beings but machines. 
 
Hermeneutics 
The approach to the marking off of African philosophy called the 
hermeneutical approach, would boast of personalities such as 
Theophilus Okere, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Okondo Okolo, Franz 
Fanon, Leonardo Harris, Lucius Outlaw and V. Y. Mudimbe as its 
exponents among others. According to these thinkers, the starting 
point of philosophy for most Africans is tied to real life experiences, 
which is built around a struggle for liberation from European 
hegemony whether cultural and/or economical. The hermeneuticists’ 
target is the search for ways of achieving freedom from the 
harms/hurts caused by European imperialism. Traditional beliefs and 
oral discourses of Africans are only useful when it aids the 
attainment of this goal of liberation; outside this purpose, they have 
no usefulness.
15
 It is called hermeneutical because one of its chief 
exponents, Tsenay Serequeberhan took-off with Gadamer and 
Heidegger as his influential guides (Hans Gadamer and Martin and 
Heidegger are two Western scholars associated with Hermeneutics). 
Some people think that Theophilus Okere initiated this school. But 
the idea does not seem to have sailed through the congregation of 
thinkers. 
Tsenay Serequeberhan, in his capital text, The Hermeneutics of 
African Philosophy argued that the problem concerns the major issue 
of the post-colonial dilemma. The problem revolves around the 
tension between the ongoing control of Africa by Europe in the 
guise of neo-colonial puppets and the ongoing influence of pre-
colonial traditions as found in rural environments. Africans need to 
assert themselves as subjects rather than as mere objects in the 
transformation of man in history.
16
 In criticizing the preceding 
theoretical proposals, Serequeberhan accuses the professional 
philosophers and ethnophilosophers of replicating the visions of 
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Europe about Africa. How? Ethnophilosophers like Senghor and 
Tempels accepted and considered as positive the classification of 
racial distinction used by Europeans to define Africans as inferior to 
the Europeans. Professional philosophers like Nkrumah and 
Hountoundji used one colonial model to replace another - a‘capitalist 
yoke’ replaced by a communist yoke’.
17
 
The appropriate solution to the European violent conquest of 
Africa should be replaced by way of a violent expulsion of European 
control, for example, as found in neo-colonial puppets of Europe. 
“The possibility of African freedom is concretized…” in the function 
of the talents of westernized Africans with the non-westernized 
members of rural Africa. In this way, Africans would ‘return to the 
source’, the true ground of African freedom. It is here that 
exploitation would fizzle out because the westernized Africans 
would invest their knowledge by the assistance they rendered to the 
rural dwellers; this is a hybrid state. At this point, fossilized, 
unexamined traditions of the past and of the colonizer are thrown out 
- this is the dance of serious critique.  The strengths and weaknesses 
are opened and held up for robust evaluation. The resultant effect 
would be nothing, but a modern African, who can act, exert himself 
rather than a being to be merely acted upon.
19
 It is here that 
Serequeberhan’s “return to the sources” and Wiredu’s “conceptual 
decolonization” seem to beat at an equal pulse rate. To my mind, 
what we need is not any kind of violence esp. physical violence like 
Franz Fanon’s writings tend to suggest. We need cultural violence, a 
kind of violence that encourages Africans to believe that they can be 
creative; that the problem is not necessarily the outsiders but 
ourselves. You can only be defeated when you are not skilful enough 
to handle the challenge before you. Slavery succeeded because we 
were not intellectually and communally organized to handle such an 
incursion; our own people aided and abetted it. Why did we fail to 
keep them off our shores? Japan defeated the westerners the first 
time they tried to enter their land even though they were 
overpowered during the second attempt of the westerners. There is 
no account in known history that our people did put up any attempt 
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at keeping them out of our shores. Why did our own people connive 
in selling their own brothers and sisters? As long as there is darkness 
(spiritual, intellectual, moral, imaginative, etc.) in the heart of men, 
they cannot avoid the stranglehold of a people, who are (more) 
organized and enlightened. 
 
The Equalization Scheme 
The preceding classifications of thoughts do not capture every trend 
in African philosophy. There are other manifestations of African 
Philosophy. This writer opines that there is another movement that is 
very unique and distinct because of what it fundamentally thinks is 
the purpose and meaning of African philosophy; it is the 
equalization scheme. The equalization scheme in African philosophy 
is my coinage. Informed by the idea that Europeans do not think that 
Africans have any philosophy, this scheme sets out to demonstrate 
that Africans have a philosophy (ies) that can be said to stand on a 
par with the submissions of Western philosophers. 
The proponents of this scheme think that we are equal to the 
West because the conceptions they have such as: universality, 
supreme being and/or ultimacy, death, eternal return of the same, 
truth as correspondence, middle term, predestination, temporality, 
atemporality, etc. are also present in the labyrinth of African 
thoughts. Their mission involves bringing forth materials from 
traditional African cultural systems such as myths, folktales, social 
organizations, oracular utterances, proverbs, artefacts, etc. that either 
connote or denote some conceptions in Western philosophy. Once 
they have done that, it is their thinking that they have shown the 
possession of philosophy by Africans and these they have done by 
trying to display points of equalization of African conceptions with 
Western philosophical conceptions. Some thinkers who may be said 
fit into this receptacle include Francis Njoku
19














, etc. Whether they succeeded or not in 
their pursuit, one point is that they revealed, by implication, that 
before their writings, Africans seem not to have had any formal 
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philosophical system like the Europeans; they did this when they 
began deducing ideas and concepts from the emblems of their 
ancestral past - proverbs, myths, folktales, proverbs, riddles, 
artefacts etc. and juxtaposing them with the philosophical systems of 
the West. Before the emergence of a barrage of these materials, 
focusing on the possible philosophical import of traditional African 
world occasioned by the perceived challenge posed by Western 
thinkers, this type of exercise seem not have existed. They subtly fell 
into the very ditch they seem to have been running away - from 
subjugation to Western intellectual domination. How? In their 
attempt to move away from a sense of the domination of their minds 
by Western ideological project, they went about trying to force 
interpretations out of African symbols to showcase concepts in 
African worldviews that matched what existed in Western 
scholarship. Thus, their pursuit was guided by the very intellectual 
stream they were avoiding. African philosophy is, for these scholars, 
a philosophical reflection that aims at showcasing the possession, by 
Africans, of concepts found in Western philosophy having African 
traditional ancestry as its reference point. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 In the exercise of the Great Debate, within which the problem of the 
definition of African philosophy arose, one thing must always be 
noted: the debate would not have arisen if the question of Hart was 
well understood as not a doubt of the African’s capacity and 
capability for philosophy and the existence of African philosophy.  
 Sequel to this is the fact that most people, who argued against 
the existence of African philosophy failed to recognize that there 
exists different strands of thoughts in African philosophy. Debating 
over traditional African emblems eclipsed the other aspects of 
African philosophy and brought forth different thought-lines such as 
universalism, hermeneutics and according to my analyses, the 
equalization scheme in African philosophy even though discourses 
on the existence of African philosophy seems to have quietened for 
some time. Until African Philosophy turns unto confronting issues 
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influencing present-day African societies and its impact on the 
development of her people and the redemption of her image as a 
dignified race by engaging the challenges of the empirical sciences, 
globalization, Information and Communication Technology, 
imperialist influenced educational curricula in our tertiary 
institutions, etc., it may not transform itself into an effective 
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